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ENFORCEMENT OF FISHING REGULATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL
WATERS: PIRACY OR PROTECTION, IS GUNBOAT DIPLOMACY THE
ONLY MEANS LEFT?
The canneries themselves fought the war by getting the limit
taken off fish and catching them all. It wlls done for patriotic
reasons but that didn't bring the fish back .... It was the same
noble impulse that stripped the forests of the West and right
now is pumping water out of California's earth faster than it can
rain back in. When the desert comes people will be sad; just as
Cannery Row was sad when all the pilchards were caught and
canned and eaten.1
I. INTRODUCTION
From the 1970s to the present, various nations have clashed
over the limited fishing resources of the high seas.2 During the
1970s, there were sixteen major international incidents between
countries over fishing rights.3 In 1975 and 1976 alone, there were
over four dozen occurrences of British frigates and tug boats
ramming Icelandic Coastguard vessels to protect British cod fish-
erman from being driven off contested fishing grounds.4 In March
1995, a major conflict arose between Canada and Spain over fish-
ery jurisdiction. A Canadian gunboat fired across the bow of a
Spanish fishing trawler, which the Canadians then seized.5 Despite
the twenty-year period between the initial conflicts and the most
recent incident, the problem of regulating the marine resources of
the high seas remains unresolved.
This Comment maintains that Canada's actions against the
1. JOHN STEINBECK, SWEET THURSDAY 1 (1954).
2. See Unilateral Jurisdiction on the High Seas, WALL ST. TRANSCRIPT, Apr. 4, 1994,
at A5.
3. See id.
4. See HANNES JONSSON, FRIENDS IN CONFLICT: THE ANGLO-ICELANDIC COD
WARS AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 168-69 (1982).
5. See Shots Fired in Fishing War Off Canada: European Union, Spain Scold Canada
After High Seas Incident, BANGOR DAILY NEWS (Maine), Mar. 10, 1995, at C12, available
in 1995 WL 5819514 [hereinafter Shots Fired].
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Spanish fishing trawlers were justified and that new U.N. regula-
tions would not necessarily have averted the conflict. Part II pro-
vides a background on the unique problems of the world's high
seas fisheries. Part III discusses the events that led up to the
March 1995 incident between Canada and Spain and analyzes the
legal issues involved. Finally, Part IV concludes that there are
possible shortfalls in the new U.N. regulatory scheme and com-
ments on its potential ineffectiveness.
II. PROBLEMS FACING THE WORLD'S OCEANS
A. Nonsustainability
For decades, global fish stocks have been harvested at an ac-
celerating rate.6 The long-held belief that the sea could provide an
inexhaustible source of nutrition has been disproved over the last
fifty years.7 The total collapse of the Monterey Bay Sardine indus-
try in the 1950s and early 1960s was perhaps the first major exam-
ple that the ocean's bounty is a finite resource.8 Since then, im-
proved technology and increased demand for fish protein have led
to similar results of depleted stocks in many other fisheries
worldwide. 9
6. In 1950, the worldwide marine catch was approximately 20 million metric tons.
See Carl Safina, The World's Imperiled Fish, Sci. AM., Nov. 1995, at 46, 50. The catch
steadily increased until 1989 when the worldwide marine catch equaled approximately 80
million metric tons. See id. Since 1989, however, worldwide catches have either stag-
nated or decreased, despite increased fishing pressure. Smaller catches combined with
increased fishing pressure would indicate a decline in global fish stocks. See id.
7. The U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) found: "In the early 1990's,
about 69% of the world's harvested species were exploited to the limits of their ability to
reproduce, were over-exploited or depleted, or were rebuilding their numbers after a pe-
riod of depletion." William Emerson, Hitting the High Seas, OECD OBSERVER, Aug. 18,
1995, at 33, available in 1995 WL 8451833.
8. From 1949 until 1962, overfishing of the Pacific sardine off the California coast
caused the complete collapse of one of California's most abundant natural resources. The
collapse in the fishery was so drastic that by 1962 only one cannery on Monterey's
"Cannery Row" remained open. See ARTHUR F. McEvoy, THE FISHERMAN'S
PROBLEM: ECOLOGY AND LAW IN THE CALIFORNIA FISHERIES, 1850-1980, at 199
(1986).
9. Other species have seen declines similar to that of the California sardine, includ-
ing the Japanese sardine, Western Pacific sauries, Atlantic menhaden, North Atlantic cod
and haddock, and salmon throughout the globe. See WILLIAM E. HALE & DAG FASMER
WITrUSEN, WORLD FISHERIES: A "TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS?" 13-14 (Woodrow
Wilson Ass'n Monograph Series in Pub. Affairs No. 4, 1971); see also Safina, supra note 6,
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As fish stocks dwindle and more fishermen compete for fewer
resources, conflicts over depleted fish stocks have become more
frequent. Disputes generally occur for one of two reasons: (1)
disagreement over jurisdictional oceanic boundaries, or (2) dis-
putes over "highly migratory" species and "straddling stocks." 10
Generally, these conflicts boil down to disputes over fish species
that move in and out of a country's exclusive economic zone
(EEZ).11 Within the EEZ, a country has jurisdiction to regulate
fishing practices.12 Once the fish move outside the EEZ, however,
foreign fishermen may overharvest the migrating species in inter-
national waters, resulting in conflicts between the governments
trying to regulate the fishery and the foreign fishermen frustrating
those regulatory efforts.
The most recent conflicts have arisen between Canada and
the European Union (EU) (specifically Spain) over the straddling
stock of turbot 13 that commonly migrate from Canada's EEZ off
Newfoundland into international waters. The most serious inci-
dents occurred when Canadian gunboats seized a Spanish fishing
vessel and severed nets from several other Spanish fishing trawlers
in international waters outside Canada's EEZ.14 Canada and the
at 50. This list is by no means a complete list of the fisheries that have suffered drastic
declines over the past thirty years.
10. Highly migratory species are fish that migrate great distances and that travel in
and out of more than one country's territorial waters. See Emerson, supra note 7.
Straddling stocks are fish that migrate from international waters into a country's territo-
rial waters. See id.
11. Article 57 of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) defines an
EEZ as an area extending no more than 200 nautical miles from the oceanic boundary of
a coastal state. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signa-
ture Dec. 10; 1982, art. 57, 21 I.L.M. 1261, 1280 (entered into force Nov. 16, 1994)
[hereinafter UNCLOS].
12. Article 56 of the Convention grants a coastal state "sovereign rights for the pur-
poses of ... exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources ... of the waters
superjacent to the sea-bed" within its EEZ. Id. art. 56, at 1280.
13. Turbot, also known as Greenland halibut, is a species of flatfish related to other
species, such as the sole, flounder, and halibut. See GAR GOODSON, FISHES OF THE
PACIFIC COAST 155 (1988). These species of groundfish are very valuable as food fish.
See id. The particular species of turbot at issue here inhabit the Grand Banks region of
the Northwest Atlantic. See Evelyne Meltzer, Global Overview of Straddling and Highly
Migratory Fish Stocks: The Nonsustainable Nature of High Seas Fisheries, 25 OCEAN
DEV. & INT'L L. 255, 297 (1994).
14. On March 9,1995, a Canadian gunboat seized the Spanish fishing trawler Estai in
international waters. See Craig Turner, 'Fish War' Heats Up Again as Canadians Cut
Boat's Net, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1995, at A7. On March 26, 1995, a Canadian patrol ves-
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EU have since resolved the specific dispute over the turbot,15 but a
larger problem remains: Will the new U.N. Conference on
Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks resolve
the broad-based fundamental problems causing the conflicts?
B. The Straddling and Highly Migratory Stock Dilemma
Most economists agree that the unique problem created by a
fishery is the lack of property rights. Property rights define owner-
ship of a resource; however, when the resource is a fish stock in in-
ternational waters, ownership becomes a relatively unatainable
concept. 16 If property rights cannot be established, natural market
forces tend to overexploit that resource.
17
Non-migratory fish stocks are less of a problem because they
tend to remain within a country's EEZ. As a result, a single gov-
ernment has quasi-property rights over the stocks and may regu-
late them as it sees fit. 18 Now, however, many, if not most, coun-
tries have mismanaged 19 their non-migratory fisheries and are
sel severed a net from another Spanish trawler, also in international waters. See id.
Spanish harvesting of the straddling stocks of turbot on the Grand Banks instigated both
incidents. See id.
15. See Canada, Europe End Fight over Turbot, But Spain Presses On Alone with Suit
in International Court, CALGARY HERALD, Sept. 30, 1995, at A5 thereinafter Spain
Presses On].
16. See HALE & WITTUSEN, supra note 9, at 18.
17. Consider the following example: Suppose 95% of all fishermen decide to fish in a
responsible and regulated manner. Then 5% of fishermen will exploit the resource to the
greatest possible extent. This overexploitation begins to diminish the fish stocks. As a
result the other 95% of fishermen are also pushed toward overexploiting the stocks, sim-
ply because the stocks will decrease without 100% regulation and there will be less reason
to fish conservatively. (Discovery Channel broadcast, Sept. 12, 1995).
18. UNCLOS article 56 describes the rights of the sovereign state within its own
EEZ:
1. In the exclusive economic zone,,the coastal State has:
(a) sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving
and managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the wa-
ters superjacent to the sea-bed and of the sea-bed and its subsoil, and with
regard to other activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of
the zone ....
UNCLOS, supra note 11, art. 56, para. 1, at 1280. UNCLOS gives a coastal state the
authority to regulate the living resources within its EEZ. Thus, non-migratory species
that remain within the EEZ are under the exclusive control of the coastal state for regula-
tory purposes.
19. Fishermen themselves acknowledge that the world's fish stocks are being poorly
managed. See Michael Parfit, Diminishing Returns: Exploiting the Ocean's Bounty,
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turning to highly migratory and straddling fish stocks to maintain
their fishing industries. 20 Thus, multiple governments compete for
a single finite resource. 21 This competition logically leads to actual
conflict between these competing governments.
The rules, if they exist, for fishing in international waters are
tenuous at best. Even when a single government regulates its own
fishing industry in international waters, boats may easily evade the
regulations by reflagging to countries that have no such regula-
tions.22 Thus, without a unified international regulation effort, the
resources of the high seas continue to be overexploited and the
number of conflicts rises as fishing jobs become increasingly de-
pendent on a rapidly diminishing resource.
III. CANADA-SPAIN "TURBOT WAR"
A. History of International Conflicts
The "turbot war" between Canada and Spain was only the
most recent development in a long history of international conflict.
One of the first major international incidents to arise over fishing
regulations was the "cod wars" of the mid-1970s between Iceland
and Great Britain.23 For some time, Iceland realized that the stock
of cod around the island nation was being depleted so severely that
the fisheries were on the verge of collapse. In order to save the
NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC, Nov. 1995, at 2, 10-11. One freezer-trawler skipper said, "There is
too much catching!" See id. at 10.
20. "The UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) reports that an increasing
number of species are targeted on the high seas as competition for animal protein from
fish intensifies and the common area for global resources diminishes. Many of these spe-
cies are straddling and highly migratory fish stocks." Meltzer, supra note 13, at 258. As
mismanagement depletes near shore fish, fishermen must turn to the high seas to com-
pensate for the decline in their local fisheries. See Emerson, supra note 7.
21. Tuna, for example, go on massive trans-oceanic migrations, which take them
through multiple EEZs. Thus, as tuna go through a country's EEZ, the country has an
incentive to harvest the resource as much as possible because they know other countries
will try and do the same. See generally WILLIAM T. BURKE, THE NEW INTERNATIONAL.
LAW OF FISHERIES: UNCLOS 1982 AND BEYOND 199-205 (1994).
22. To reflag, a vessel simply changes its registration to a country that does not im-
plement established controls or is not subject to existing regulatory conventions. See Em-
erson, supra note 7. Reflagging effectively allows the boat to fish indiscriminately be-
cause it is no longer subject to any fishing regulations on the high seas. See id. Panama,
Liberia, and Belize are notorious for allowing the practice of reflagging. See id.
23. See generally J6NSSON, supra note 4.
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fisheries, Iceland unilaterally extended its jurisdictional fishing
border from the commonly recognized 12 miles
24 to 200 miles. 25
British fishing vessels were fishing well within this 200-mile
zone and refused to recognize Iceland's claim to exclusive fishing
rights in the area. The resulting "cod wars" culminated in military
confrontations between Icelandic Coastguard vessels trying to
chase off British fishermen and British warships ramming the Ice-
landic Coastguard vessels.26 This incident, which to this day
evokes strong emotions between the two countries, was effectively
resolved in 1982 when the United Nations Convention on. the Law
of the Sea (UNCLOS) extended all coastal states' EEZs from
continental and island base lines to 200 miles.
27
Over the past few years, fish wars have erupted with greater
frequency. During the summer of 1994, a "tuna war" ignited be-
tween British and Spanish fishermen in Arctic waters.28 The Nor-
wegian Coastguard is now confronting Icelandic fishing trawlers
over contested fishing grounds. 29 Both India and Morocco are
having problems off their coasts with foreign fishing vessels.30 In
1990, Namibia enforced its fishing regulations by expelling 200
Spanish fishing boats. 31 Most recently, the Canada-Spain incident
involved the use of firearms and arresting powers, signaling the
possibility that fish wars may soon take their toll in human lives.
B. Factual Background of the Canada-Spain Incident
On March 9, 1995, a Canadian gunboat pursued the Spanish
fishing trawler Estai, fired warning shots across her bow, and con-
fiscated the vessel. 32 This confrontation took place in what is
24. See SHIGERU ODA, INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF SEA RESOURCES at xvi (2d
ed. 1989).
25. See J6NSSON, supra note 4, at 161. The South American countries of Chile, Ec-
uador, and Peru made the first declarations of 200-mile zones of sovereign jurisdiction in
August 1952. See ODA, supra note 24, at 21.
26. See JONSSON, supra note 4, at 168-69.
27. See UNCLOS, supra note 11, art. 57, at 1280.





32. See Shots Fired, supra, note 5.
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known as the "nose and tail" of the Grand Banks region, just out-
side Canada's 200-mile fishing jurisdiction, off the Newfoundland
coast [see figure 1].33 Canadian officials arrested the captain,
seized the trawler, and impounded it in a Canadian port. The Ca-
nadians claimed that the conflict concerned the overfishing of
straddling stocks of turbot. Both Spain and the EU claimed that
they had the right to fish as they pleased within international wa-
ters and that Canada was in clear violation of international law.34
fihn rud n.ee:the Ban. .. B
a tGrand
Figure 1. The Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization management divisions
3 5
Two weeks after the seizure of the Estai, Canadian patrol ves-sels were involved in another incident with Spanish fishing trawl-
ers. The Canadians chased Spanish fishermen off the disputed
fishing grounds and severed the nets from one trawler.36 Both
sides claimed that they acted well within their rights, and neither
sidlewould concede defeat. On April 15, 1995, however, the EU
and Canada managed to resolve their differences and reach a mu-
33. The Grand Banks region extends out from Newfoundland in a southeasterly di-
rection. See Meltzer, supra note 13, at 298 fig. 13. As Canada's EEZ stretches around
Newfoundland, portions of the Grand Banks, known as the "nose" and the "tail" of the
bank, are left outside the EEZ and beyond Canada's protection. See id. at 297-98 & fig.
13.
34. See Shots Fired, supra note 5.
35. The map is from the Newfoundland government's press kit. See Meltzer, supra
note 13, at 298 fig. 13.
36. See Turner, supra note 14.
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tually acceptable settlement to the dispute. 37 Nevertheless, Spain




Canada's seizure of the Estai was based on Canadian law,40
authorizing it to enforce fishing regulations "beyond [its] own 200-
mile limits into the so-called straddling areas. '41 The problem
with using national law to justify this action was that the act di-
rectly contravened international law. Spain and the EU, in turn,
accused Canada of pure and simple piracy, claiming that Canada
was in clear violation of international law.4 2
Canada's Coastal Fisheries Protection Act (CFPA), as
amended in 1994, unilaterally extended the jurisdiction of Can-
ada's enforcement zone to all areas under the Northwest Atlantic
Fisheries Organization (NAFO) regulatory area. Section 5.2 of
the Act provides that "[n]o person, being aboard a foreign fishing
vessel of a prescribed class, shall, in the NAFO Regulatory Area,
fish or prepare to fish for a straddling stock in contravention of any
37. In the settlement, Canada agreed to decrease its Northwest Atlantic Fisheries
Organization (NAFO) quota, while the EU was allowed to increase its quota. See Anne
Swardson, Canada, EU Reach Agreement Aimed at Ending Fishing War, WASH. POST,
Apr. 16, 1995, at A21. Both parties also agreed that all ships fishing the Grand Banks
would carry neutral inspectors and would be subject to sanctions and penalties if viola-
tions occurred. See id.
38. See Spain Presses On, supra note 15.
39. Article 7 of the U.N. Charter created the International Court of Justice (ICJ).
See SHABTAI ROSENNE, THE WORLD COURT: WHAT IT IS AND How IT WORKS 23 (4th
rev. ed. 1989). Article 92 of the Charter states that the ICJ shall be the principal judicial
organ of the United Nations. See id. Thus, the ICJ is the appropriate forum for U.N.
members to resolve legal disputes based on U.N. agreements. See id.
40. Canada passed the Coastal Fisheries Protection Act (CFPA), as amended in 1994,
which authorizes Canadian law enforcement officials to enforce NAFO policies concern-
ing straddling stocks outside Canada's traditional EEZ. See Coastal Fisheries Protection
Act, R.S.C. ch. C-33, § 1 (1985), amended by R.S.C. ch. 14, § 1 (1994) (Can.) [hereinafter
CFPAJ.
41. Tobin and Turbot in Turbulent Waters, EDMONTON J., Mar. 14, 1995, at A8.
42. See Colin Nickerson, Canadians Lash Out in Fishing War: Cut One Trawler's
Lines, Send 18 Spanish Vessels Fleeing, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 27, 1995, at 1.
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of the prescribed conservation and management measures. ' 43 This
section of the CFPA made the EU fishing vessels' actions illegal
under Canadian law because they were fishing in contravention of
the NAFO quotas.
Furthermore, section 7 of the CFPA provides that "a protec-
tion officer may ... for the purpose of ensuring compliance with
this Act and the regulations, board and inspect any fishing vessel
found within Canadian fisheries waters or the NAFO Regulatory
Area."44 The NAFO Regulatory Area consists of not only the re-
gional waters of Canada's Atlantic coast, but also all the interna-
tional waters of the North Atlantic.45 Thus, section 7 gives express
jurisdiction to Canada's fisheries officials to enforce the CFPA in
international waters outside Canada's EEZ granted by UNCLOS.
Finally, section 8, which grants arresting power, provides that
"a protection officer may arrest without warrant any person who
the officer suspects on reasonable grounds has committed an of-
fense under this Act."' 46 The Canadian officers were acting upon
this grant of authority when they arrested the captain of the Estai
and seized the vessel. The arresting officials claimed that the of-
fenders were fishing the straddling stock of turbot in contravention
of the NAFO conservation and management measures. Similar to
Iceland's actions twenty years earlier,47 Canada effectively ex-
tended its jurisdiction into international waters to remedy a prob-
lem that a toothless NAFO could not solve. 48
Canada never expressly claimed a legal right to act but con-
centrated more on its moral right to protect its own interests.
49
43. Coastal Fisheries Protection Act, R.S.C. ch. 14, at § 5.2.
44. Id. § 7(a) (emphasis added).
45. See Meltzer, supra note 13, at 297-98.
46. Coastal Fisheries Protection Act, R.S.C. ch. 14, at § 8.
47. Iceland progressively extended its exclusive jurisdiction to 200 nautical miles be-
yond its oceanic boundary, in order to protect the dwindling stock of cod that was essen-
tail to the Icelandic economy. See JONSSON, supra note 4, at 154.
48. The NAFO has no actual power to enforce any of its recommended conservation
measures of straddling fish stocks. See Meltzer, supra note 13, at 299. Thus, the EU has
unilaterally set its own quotas well above levels suggested by the NAFO. See id. For ex-
ample, in 1989, the NAFO allocated a catch quota of 13,000 tons to the EU (then the
European Community), but the EU ignored this figure and set its quota at 160,000 tons,
12 times higher than the NAFO figure. See id.; see also William McCloskey, Fencing the
World's Fishing Grounds, BALTIMORE SUN, Apr. 28, 1995, at 19A.
49. See Tobin and Turbot in Turbulent Waters, supra note 41.
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Canada claimed that it was defending one of the last viable
groundfish stocks in the North Atlantic and that Spain was fishing
well beyond the NAFO quotas.
50
Many questions were left unresolved by the "turbot wars."
(1) Did Canada violate international law? (2) What problems ex-
isted with the previous legal regime regarding fishing on the high
seas? (3) Did Canda have any alternate means of resolving the
problem? (4) How could have Spain resolved the problem? (5)
What has been done to resolve the problems? (6) Will the new en-
forcement provisions solve the problems plaguing the high seas
fisheries?
2. Applicable International Law: Did Canada Violate
International Law?
UNCLOS is the relevant legal regime that governs Canada,
Spain, and all other signatories with regard to fishing rights on the
high seas.51 Article 116 addresses the right to fish on the high seas:
All States have the right for their nationals to engage in fishing
on the high seas subject to:
(a) their treaty obligations;
(b) the rights and duties as well as the interests of coastal States
provided for, inter alia, in article 63, paragraph 2, and articles
64 to 67; and
(c) the provisions of this section.52
At this point, it would appear that Spain was within its rights to be
fishing on the high seas. The relevant section of article 63 pro-
vides:
Where the same stock or stocks of associated species occur both
within the exclusive economic zone and in an area beyond and
adjacent to the zone, the coastal State and the States fishing for
such stocks in the adjacent area shall seek, either directly or
through appropriate subregional or regional organizations, to
50. Minister of Fisheries, Brian Tobin, and the Canadian government claimed the
right. See id.
51. UNCLOS defines the high seas as the ocean areas falling outside all country's
EEZ, where no country has exclusive control over the ocean's natural resources. See
UNCLOS, supra note 11, art. 86, at 1286.
52. Id. art. 116, at 1290.
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agree upon the measures necessary for the conservation of
these stocks in the adjacent area. 53
Article 63 directs the parties to turn to the subregional or re-
gional organization that would normally regulate the contested
area. This proviso obligated Canada and Spain to turn to the
NAFO, which is the regional organization overseeing the turbot
fishery on the Grand Banks.54 Initially, it would appear that
Spain's refusal to comply with the NAFO quotas was a violation of
article 63. Careful analysis of the article's language, however, in-
dicates that Spain did not violate the article. The operative words
are "shall seek" and "agree." Article 63 only obligates the nations
to seek to agree; it does not require actual agreement. Therefore,
Canada is unable to legally justify its actions based on UNCLOS
article 63.
Barring resolution at this stage, part XV of UNCLOS pro-
vides procedures relating to the settlement of disputes.55 Most
noticeable in the dispute settlement section of the treaty, and most
important for Spain's purposes, is the requirement that parties re-
solve their differences by "peaceful means. ' 56 Article 279 pro-
vides:
States Parties shall settle any dispute between them concerning
the interpretation or application of this Convention by peaceful
means in accordance with Article 2, paragraph 3, of the Charter
of the United Nations and, to this end, shall seek a solution by
the means indicated in Article 33, paragraph 1, of the Charter.57
Similarly, article 2, paragraph 3 of the U.N. Charter provides:
"All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful
means in such a manner that international peace and security, and
justice, are not endangered. '58
53. Id. art. 63, at 1282.
54. NAFO is a 14-member organization composed of members from both the EU and
Canada. See Meltzer, supra note 13, at 297. Despite the NAFO's authority to set quotas,
foreign fleets have surpassed NAFO quotas for most of the species in the Northwest At-
lantic ever since the NAFO's formation in 1986. See id. As a result, groundfish stocks
have suffered significant declines to the extent that, out of the seven different viable fish
stocks on the Grand Banks, only turbot stock remains. See id.
55. See UNCLOS, supra note 11, pt. XV, at 1322-26.
56. See id. art. 279, at 1322.
57. Id. (emphasis added).
58. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 3.
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Arguably, escalation in the use of warships by nations in-
volved in fishing disputes "endangers" international peace and se-
curity. Spain may also assert that Canada endangered interna-
tional justice by its enforcement in international waters of an act
not enforceable under international law. Thus, a commonsense
reading of UNCLOS article 279 and U.N. Charter article 2 would
indicate that Canada's seizure of the Spanish fishing trawlers and
arrest of the fishermen violated these "peaceful means" provisions.
UNCLOS article 279 indicates that members look to article
33, paragraph 1 of the U.N. Charter to determine the resolution
methods that Canada was obligated to pursue. 59 Article 33, para-
graph 1 provides: "The parties to any dispute, the continuance of
which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace
and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, en-
quiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, re-
sort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means
of their own choice."'60 Canada may argue that it attempted to ne-
gotiate and resorted to the NAFO, the regional agency, to resolve
its problems with Spain. The sufficiency of their attempts remains
questionable, and Spain may most likely claim that Canada did not
make the requisite attempts to resolve the problems in compliance
with article 33.
According to the black letter law, UNCLOS article 110 ad-
dresses Canada's most blatant violation of UNCLOS. Article 110
limits the use of warships on the high seas, providing that "a war-
ship which encounters on the high seas a foreign ship ... is not
justified in boarding it unless there is reasonable ground for sus-
pecting" that the ship is involved in some enumerated illegal activ-
ity.61 Matters involving fisheries are not enumerated offenses. 62 In
59. See UNCLOS, supra note 11, art. 279, at 1322.
60. U.N. CHARTER art. 33, para. 1. Enquiry is a process in which an impartial third
party ascertains the relevant facts in order to facilitate the process of finding a suitable
basis for a settlement. See LELAND M. GOODRICH ET AL., CHARTER OF THE UNITED
NATIONS: COMMENTARY AND DOCUMENTS 261-62 (3d rev. ed. 1969). Mediation and
conciliation involve third party assistance to bring the disputing parties together to facili-
tate their negotiations. See id. at 262. Arbitration is a method in which parties agree be-
forehand to accept a third party's resolution of the problem after the third party has
heard the relevant facts of the case. See id.
61. UNCLOS, supra note 11, art. 110, at 1289. The enumerated activities include pi-
racy, slave trade, unauthorized broadcasting, a ship without nationality, and a ship refus-
ing to fly its flag. See id.
210 [Vol. 19:199
Enforcing Fishing Regulations
its defense, Canada may argue that Spain was participating in an
act of piracy which is an enumerated offense. Webster's Third
New International Dictionary defines piracy as "robbery on the
high seas."' 63 If the straddling stock of turbot is considered a vital
resource for the Newfoundland economy, then Canada may claim
that Spain committed an act of piracy by robbing Newfoundland of
a vital resource, thereby justifying Canada's use of warships under
article 110.
The piracy argument may be unnecessary, however, because,
in practice, article 110 proves to be ineffectual and misguided.
Most major fishing states used and continue to use warships in the
regulation of fisheries matters.64 Intuitively, this use of warships
makes sense. The clear markings of warships help enforcement
officials avoid the distrust and doubt that they might otherwise en-
counter when confronting vessels on the high seas.65 Thus, it is
doubtful that Spain has a sufficient cause of action or that it may
bring sanctions against Canada based on UNCLOS article 110.
3. The Ambiguity Problem
Compounding the dispute between Canada and Spain is the
ambiguity of the pertinent laws. Article 279 of UNCLOS directs
states to settle disputes in accordance with articles of the U.N.
Charter. Article 2, paragraph 3 of the Charter seems quite clear; a
primary concern of the drafters was that any dispute should be re-
solved by peaceful means. 66 When considering this provision in
conjunction with UNCLOS article 33, however, it becomes diffi-
cult to determine whether these two provisions have been satisfied.
The problem is determining what should occur if article 33's pro-
visions do not resolve the dispute between Canada and Spain.
Canada was protecting a finite fishing resource during the incident.
Thus, time was of the essence, and many of the possible resolution
options were not viable because of the time and effort that they
would have required.67 Ultimately, Canada did not have many
62. See BURKE, supra note 21, at 312-13.
63. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1723 (1986).
64. See BURKE, supra note 21, at 312-13.
65. See id. at 313.
66. See GOODRICH, supra note 60, at 42.
67. The methods of enquiry, mediation and conciliation, arbitration, and judicial set-
tlement may all take a significant amount of time to work.
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options because it tried to enforce rights not clearly articulated in
any international agreement.
Ambiguity in UNCLOS is found in its fisheries management
provisions. Article 117 of UNCLOS provides that "[a]ll States
have the duty to take, or to "co-operate" with other States in tak-
ing, such measures for their respective nationals as may be neces-
sary for the conservation of the living resources of the high seas."'68
The duty 6f a state to "co-operate," however, is a rather amor-
phous concept.69 The term "co-operate" presents the following
question: Under UNCLOS, at what point is a State considered to
be "cooperative"?
Another problem with article 117 is the definition of
"conservation." One nation may-consider a measure -to be conser-
vationist while another nation may consider it to be overharvest-
ing.70 UNCLOS does not clarify the term "conservation" in any
definitional or explanatory language.
Article 116's provision that the "interests of coastal States" be
taken into account is also vague, 71 UNCLOS does not specify
which interests to weigh or the amount of weight to give to each
interest. Absent such interpretation of article 116, Canada may
argue that Spain and the EU violated UNCLOS by: (1) not coop-
erating with Canada and the NAFO in abiding by appropriate con-
servation measures, and (2) refusing to consider Canada's legiti-
mate interests when fishing the straddling stocks of turbot
migrating in and out of Canada's EEZ. To be effective, article 116
may need to be interpreted as giving the coastal state a superior
right for issuing conservation measures that the high seas fishing
states should recognize. 72
Canada has a strong argument that UNCLOS required Spain
68. UNCLOS, supra note 11, art. 117, at 1291.
69. UNCLOS has no provisions describing or defining the meaning of "co-operate."
See ODA, supra note 24, at xxii.
70. One suggested policy is that if there is not sufficient scientific data on a particular
resource then that resource should have no limits placed on it. Proponents of this policy
argue that people should not limit the harvest of a resource if they are unsure of its capac-
ity. Others believe that this policy is wasteful. See generally Emerson, supra note 7.
71. See ODA, supra note 24, at xxi.
72. See Edward L. Miles & William T. Burke, Pressures on the United Nations eon-
vention on the Law of the Sea of 1982 Arising from New Fisheries Conflicts: The Problem
of Straddling Stocks, 20 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 343,352 (1989).
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and the EU to act in a more cooperative manner concerning fisher-
ies management. Spain and the EU may argue, however, that
even if they were not cooperating in the prescribed manner, Can-
ada should have resorted to the dispute resolution provisions set
forth in UNCLOS and should not have violated international law
by use of force.
4. Did Canada Have a Choice?
What other forms of recourse could Canada have taken to ef-
fectively protect the turbot fishery on the Grand Banks from over-
fishing by the EU members? Arguably, Canada should first have
turned to economic or political retaliation, but the problems of ef-
fectiveness and expediency remain.
a. Economic and Political Sanctions
Because Canada and the EU are not major trading partners,
the effectiveness of economic and political sanctions is question-
able.73 Thus, Canada's imposition of economic sanctions on EU
imports and exports would most likely have had little or no deter-
rent effect on the level of fishing that the EU conducted on the
Grand Banks.
Assuming arguendo that economic sanctions were effective,
the time lag between imposing such sanctions and the removal of
Spanish fishermen from the Grand Banks could be so long that the
fish stocks would already be depleted to levels below the maxi-
mum sustainable yield.74 Therefore, Canada was forced to find a
quicker solution to the problem.
73. Economic sanctions would include imposing import tariffs on goods coming into
Canada from the EU. Political sanctions would include requiring entry visas for tourists
from Spain entering Canada.
74. The NAFO uses scientific data to estimate the maximum sustainable yield that a
fishery can support. To achieve this figure, the NAFO sets total allowable catch (TAC)
limits on specific fisheries. For 1995, the NAFO set the TAC for turbot at 27,000 tons.
See Shots Fired, supra note 5. Of this TAC, the NAFO gave Canada 60% (approximately
16,000 tons) and the EU 13% (approximately 3400 tons). See id. The EU, however,
claimed entitlement to 69%, or 19,000 tons of the catch. See id. Thus, in early 1995, the
fishery was being harvested at a rate that exceeded the NAFO's recommended TAC by
56%, or approximately 15,600 tons. This overharvesting would result in the depletion of
the turbot stock below its maximum sustainable yield.
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b. Judicial Recourse
If Canada had sought redress in the ICJ, it may have been
successful if the court had adopted the interpretation of UNCLOS
article 116 proposed by Professors Edward L. Miles and William
T. Burke. Miles and Burke suggest:
If Article 116 is to be effective, it may need to be interpreted as
follows: to authorize the coastal state to secure its superior right
by prescribing conservation measures with which high seas
fishing states are obliged to comply. The rights of the coastal
state, expressly made superior to the high seas fishing state,
would otherwise be empty and the high seas state would have
-no meaningful obligation different from any other state. 75
Thus, according to Miles and Burke's interpretation of article 116,
the coastal state, Canada, should be given a superior right over the
high seas state, Spain, regarding fishing regulations.
Miles and Burke's interpretation seems logical if one consid-
ers the intent of the drafters to give force and effect to the lan-
guage of article 116, which reads "[a]ll States have the right ... to
engage in fishing on the high seas subject to... the rights and du-
ties as well as the interests of the coastal States."'76 It should be as-
sumed that the language concerning the "interests of the coastal
States" was intended to give the coastal state superior regulatory
rights on the high seas adjacent to its own EEZ. This interpreta-
tion would be the most efficient means of allowing the coastal state
to protect its "rights," "duties," and "interests." Any other inter-
pretation of this language would take any substantive meaning
away from the rights of the coastal state and allow the high seas
state to fish in as unregulated a manner as it desired.
c. New Regulations
Finally, Canada could have waited and attempted to encour-
age the United Nations to draft a new multinational agreement to
regulate more adequately the high seas fisheries. The United Na-
tions essentially drafted such an agreement in December 1995 with
the U.N. Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migra-
tory Fish Stocks: Agreement for the Implementation of the provi-
75. Miles & Burke, supra note 72, at 352.
76. UNCLOS,supra note 11, art. 116, at 1290 (emphasis added).
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sions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS Implementation Agreement). 77. Although the Agree-
ment was entered into soon after the incident, it is likely that the
Agreement was motivated by the occurrence of the incident.
Twenty years ago, Iceland took emergency steps to save a
fishery that the international community would not protect.78
Canada is arguably now doing the same for its turbot fishery. Of-
ten, international response to the pressures and demands on the
ocean's resources is too slow to meet the need for their protection.
Unilateral action by national governments is often the catalyst re-
quired to generate the necessary protection on an international
level. 79 Thus, Canada may argue that the United Nations would
not have ratified the new agreement as rapidly as it did without
Canada's affirmative actions to protect its resources.
5. Spain's Resolution Options
Spain's easiest and most expedient means of resolving its
problems with Canada would have been simply to agree to the to-
tal allowable catch (TAC) limits recommended by the NAFO.80
From a political perspective, this option does not even rise to the
level of being an option. Other nations would view this as a dere-
liction of Spain's national interests and prerogatives. No nation
could be expected to maintain such a weak position before its citi-
zens and the rest of the world.
Spain's second option would have been to settle the dispute
through diplomatic negotiations as required by article 33 of the
77. United Nations Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish
Stocks: Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Con-
vention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, Relating to the Conservation and
Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, opened for sig-
nature Dec. 4, 1995, 34 I.L.M. 1542 [hereinafter UNCLOS Implementation Agreement].
78. See generally J6NSSON, supra note 4.
79. As a result of Iceland's "cod wars" with Great Britain and continuing pressure by
an ever-increasing number of coastal states, UNCLOS adopted the 200-nautical mile
EEZ provision so that it would apply on an international level. See generally ROBERT E.
HAGE, THE THIRD UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA: A
CANADIAN RETROSPECTIVE 8-9 (1983).
80. Spain, as well as the entire EU, have protested the TAC limits set by the NAFO.
See Miles & Burke, supra note 72, at 345. The EU countries under the NAFO do not
have to follow the NAFO's TAC recommendations if they file a protest with the NAFO.
See Meltzer, supra note 13, at 299.
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U.N. Charter. In the context of international incidents, this prob-
lem-solving method is a popular route, though not always com-
pletely satisfactory. 81 This option would be beneficial because the
parties would stay out of court. Questions concerning the interpre-
tation of UNCLOS, however, would remain unanswered. Spain
also could have resorted to the third-party resolution options in
article 33 of the U.N. Charter, such as enquiry, mediation and
conciliation, and arbitration.
82
Spain's legal recourse through the UNCLOS provisions in-
volves procedures to bring a lawsuit against Canada based on in-
ternational law.83 By filing a lawsuit, Spain may seek to have the
appropriate tribunal rule on whether Canada violated UNCLOS.
If Canada is found to be in violation of international law, Spain
may recover damages suffered by the captain and owner of the
Estai.
6. Actiral Resolution
In mid-April 1995, about five weeks after the "turbot war"
started, Canada and the EU resolved their differences regarding
the turbot by agreeing upon a new set of regulations and enforce-
ment procedures. 84 By working with the NAFO, the two sides
agreed to set new catch limits for turbot on the Grand Banks.85 In
81. In the actual resolution of the dispute, the EU settled its differences with Canada,
but, Spain still brought suit in the ICJ. See Spain Presses On, supra note 38, at A5.
82. See U.N. CHARTER art. 33.
83. Article 281 provides that "the procedures provided for in this Part apply only
where no settlement has been reached by recourse to such means and the agreement be-
tween the parties does not exclude any further procedure." UNCLOS, supra note 11, art.
281, at 1322. In the situation between Canada and Spain, no settlement was reached at
the point when shots were fired, and thus, Spain turned to the procedures set forth in
UNCLOS. Article 286 provides: "Subject to section 3, any dispute concerning the inter-
pretation or application of this Convention shall, where no settlement has been reached
by recourse to section 1, be submitted at the request of any party to the dispute to the
court or tribunal having jurisdiction under this section." Id. art. 286, at 1322. Under arti-
cle 286 Spain had the option to file a case in the ICJ.
84. See supra note 37.
85. See Agreed Minute on the Conservation and Management of Fish Stocks, done
Apr. 20, 1995, Can.-EC, 34 I.L.M. 1260 [hereinafter Agreed Minute]. The parties agreed
to lower Canada's TAC for turbot to 10,000 metric tons per year, and to raise the EU's
TAC to 10,000 metric tons per year. See id. Annex II, at 1271-72. The NAFO oversees
this agreement. See id. at 1262. To demonstrate the discrepandy prior to the agreement,
consider the total catches for the previous year: in 1994, Spain caught 44,000 tons of fish
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response to the agreement, Canada repealed portions of its CFPA,
which granted the controversial unilateral jurisdiction.8 6  By
August 1995, the two agreed on the settlement that was subse-
quently ratified by delegates from 100 nations.
87
Despite the settlement between Canada and the EU, Spain
filed a complaint with the ICJ in late March before the settlement
had been finalized.88 After the settlement was reached, Spain
continued with its suit, submitting written arguments to the court
in September 1995.89 Thus, Canada will still have to answer to
Spain's accusations that it broke international law when it fired
upon and seized the Spanish fishing vessel.90
Spain based its original complaint on the amended 1994 ver-
sion of the CFPA. Spain claimed that the provisions of the Act,
which allowed Canadian officials to seize vessels in international
waters, were illegal and that the appropriate international tribunal
should invalidate them.91 Spain's complaint included the following
requests:
(A) that the Court find that the legislation of Canada, in so far
as it claims to exercise a jurisdiction over ships flying a foreign
flag on the high seas, outside the exclusive economic zone of
Canada, is not opposable to the Kingdom of Spain;
(B) that the Court adjudge' and declare that Canada is bound to
refrain from any repetition of the reported acts, and to offer to
the Kingdom of Spain the reparation that is due, in the form of
an indemnity of which the amount must cover all the damages
and injuries occasioned; and
(C) that, consequently, the Court declare also that the boarding
on the high seas, on 9 March 1995, of the ship Estai flying the
flag of Spain, and the measures of coercion and the exercise of
jurisdiction over that ship and over its captain, constitute a con-
in the contested area, while Canada took only 4,000 tons, an 11 to 1 ratio. See Nanda, su-
pra note 31, at D04.
86. See Agreed Minute, supra note 85, at 1263.
87. See Foreign Digest: Canada: Delegates OK Fishing Pact, SUN SENTINEL, Aug. 5,
1995, at 19A, available in 1995 WL 8825146.
88. See Spain Brings a Case Against Canada, COMMUNIQUt, Mar. 29, 1995, at 1
[hereinafter Spain Brings Case].
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crete violation of the aforementioned principles and norms of
international law.
92
On April 27, 1995, Canada contested the ICJ's jurisdiction in
this matter. The court gave Spain until September 29, 1995 to file
a memorial 93 to argue jurisdiction, and Spain subsequently met this
deadline. Canada filed its counter-memorial on the subject of ju-
risdiction on February 29, 1996.
94
Because of its recent ratification, UNCLOS is a relatively un-
tested document in the ICJ. When the untried nature of UNCLOS
is factored in with the possible political influences involved in an
international tribunal, the actual outcome of this case becomes
very unpredictable. On moral grounds, Canada may be able to
claim a right. Looking to the black letter law, however, Spain has
a stronger argument.
Canada should not back down from the position that Spain
threatened a vital resource and that only immediate and decisive
action could help prevent the economic and environmental disas-
ter that would occur from continued overfishing. 95 Whether Can-
ada wins or loses in the ICJ, however, may be overshadowed by its
victory on moral grounds and its role in the process of pushing the
United Nations to enact more effective regulations regarding high
seas fishing.
IV. THE NEW REGIME
In December 1995, under intense pressure from the interna-
tional fishing community, the U.N. General Assembly adopted the
new UNCLOS Implementation Agreement concerning straddling
and highly migratory fish stocks. 96 The Agreement develops new
standards of regulation by simply clarifying much of the existing
92. Spain Brings Case, supra note 88, at 2.
93. A memorial is the equivalent of a complaint in a U.S. court. See ROSENNE, supra
note 39, at 38.
94. See Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (Spain v. Can.), COMMUNIQUt, May 2, 1995, at 1.
95. Canada's best chance of success in the ICJ would be to convince the court to ac-
cept Miles and Burke's interpretation of Article 116 of UNCLOS, yet the problem of the
ambiguous "peaceful means" provision still remains. See Miles & Burke, supra note 72,
at 352.
96. UNCLOS Implementation Agreement, supra note 77; see also Mark Christopher-
son, Note, Toward a Rational Harvest: The United Nations Agreement on Straddling Fish
Stocks and Highly Migratory Species, 5 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 357, 358 (1996).
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UNCLOS language.97 Thus, the main problem with the UNCLOS
Implementation Agreement is its duplication of the currently inef-
fectual UNCLOS. 98
A. Application to the Canada-Spain Incident
The question now is whether the new regulatory scheme under
the UNCLOS Implementation Agreement would have helped avoid
the problem that arose between Canada and Spain. Application of
each of the Agreement's relevant articles to the specific situation be-
tween the conflicting countries will reveal that the problems of in-
ternational fishing regulation have yet to be completely resolved.
1. Defining Cooperation
As pointed out earlier, one of the main problems with the
UNCLOS provisions pertaining to high seas fisheries was the unde-
fined nature of the term "cooperation." 99 The drafters of the
UNCLOS Implemenation Agreement were obviously aware of
UNCLOS's shortcomings, and they came up with new definitions in
the Agreement describing cooperation .100 Article 5 gives an ex-
tensive list of obligations for coastal states and fishing states, which
include: achieving optimum utilization of resources, regulating
based on the best scientific data, minimizing pollution, and many
other like-minded policy goals. 101 The article obligates states in no
uncertain terms by using the language "coastal States and States
fishing on the high seas shall."'1 02 Thus, the states must follow the
provisions of this article in order to be deemed cooperative.
Applying these requirements to Canada and Spain, there is a
problem concerning interpretation of scientific data. The major
point of conflict between the two nations would be over the scien-
tific data used to determine the optimal harvest of the turbot fishery.
Because the data is weak and contestable, Spain may argue that it
was fishing at an optimal level, and therefore, be said to be cooper-
ating.
97. See Christopherson, supra note 96, at 358.
98. See id.
99. See UNCLOS, supra note 11, art. 117, at 1291.
100. See Christopherson, supra note 96, at 368.
101. See UNCLOS Implementation Agreement, supra note 77, art. 5, at 1550.
102. Id. (emphasis added).
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2. The Role of the Regional Organization
Perhaps the most significant improvement imposed by the
UNCLOS Implementation Agreement is the requirement of arti-
cle 8:
1. Coastal States and States fishing on the high seas shall, in ac-
cordance with the Convention, pursue cooperation in relation
to straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks either
directly or through appropriate subregional or regional fisheries
management organizations or arrangements, taking into ac-
count the specific characteristics of the subregion or region, to
ensure effective conservation and management of such
stocks.103
This article mandates states to join the management bodies or
work in cooperation with the coastal states to regulate the fisher-
ies. Article 8 also provides that only the states, who are members
of the organizations or are working with the coastal states to man-
age the fisheries, are allowed to fish in the areas governed by the
relevant organization. 10 4
The major problem solved by these new provisions is reflag-
ging.105 By requiring fishermen to join the management organiza-
tions or work with the coastal states, reflagging becomes an exer-
cise in futility. The purpose of reflagging is to avoid the reach of
the management divisions. By requiring all fishermen to cooper-
ate with regional management efforts, however, reflagging no
longer allows avoidance of management regulations.
Part Three of the UNCLOS Implementation Agreement sets
forth specific obligations for the organizations regarding methods
of regulation. 10 6 These obligations are the main method of im-
proving regulations of straddling and highly migratory fisheries.
Nevertheless, the problems may not be solved for Canada, Spain,
and the turbot.
The problem that the new Agreement does not resolve for
Canada and Spain is the consensual nature of NAFO. 10 7 Each
member may avoid compliance with any NAFO decision by filing
103. Id. art. 8, para. 1, at 1553-54 (emphasis added).
104. See id. art. 8, para. 4, at 1554.
105. See supra note 22.
106. See UNCLOS Implementation Agreement, supra note 77, pt. 3, at 1553-58.
107. See Christopherson, supra note 96, at 374.
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an objection within sixty days of the decision. 108 Spain and the EU
have traditionally taken this route in order to avoid compliance
with NAFO catch quotas. 109 The new Agreement does not ad-
dress this problem either directly or indirectly. n 0 Thus, Spain may
still avoid compliance with the NAFO quotas, leaving the parties
to litigate their differences over the definition of "co-operation"
and putting Canada and Spain right back where they started.
V. CONCLUSION
The conflict between Canada and Spain is one of a long series
of disputes arising with greater frequency as the world's oceans be-
come increasingly depleted. Legally, Spain may be able to declare
victory. Looking at the bigger picture, however, Canada's actions
set in motion the wheels of change that are necessary to protect
and improve high seas resources.
It still remains to be seen whether the UNCLOS Implemen-
tation Agreement will help reduce the number of conflicts. The
most recent U.N. action, however, may be nothing more than a re-
affirmation of international agreements currently in place. The in-
ternational community learned that the ocean's bounty is finite,
and now it must change its ways to reflect this reality.
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108. See id.
109. See Meltzer, supra note 13, at 298-99.
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